Britain is the world’s most European country. So why has its pro-European 'Party of In' coll
...and what must be done for the In campaign to regain the initiative?
In March and April 2014, two “leader’s debates” were organised by LBC Radio and the BBC between Nigel Farage and Nick Clegg on the subject of continued British EU membership. The former was introduced as “leader of the party of Out” (UKIP), while the latter was dubbed “leader of the party of In” (the Liberal Democrats).
The subsequent general elections of May 2015 crushed the Liberal Democrats, overturning the political order established in Britain since the interwar years, whereby the Liberals were typically the third party. This was quite a turnaround from their meteoric rise via the coalition government established following the 2010 elections.
Though Clegg clearly lost the debate, the Liberal Democrats did not suffer calamity in May 2014 (European elections) and 2015 solely for this reason. After having campaigned on the basis of keeping promises, the party collapsed in the polls as soon as it reneged on its now-infamous commitment to students, never recovering.
Considering the debate was a boon to Farage, in its aftermath Nick Robinson commented, “does that mean that Nick Clegg's idea to challenge him to debate has backfired and done so badly? Not necessarily”, since Clegg’s support might grow. Yet it is now clear that Clegg’s attempt to rekindle his party’s ailing fortunes failed.
UKIP set itself the mission of supplanting the Liberal Democrats as Britain’s third party. In a double irony, UKIP became the largest British party at the May 2014 European Parliament elections (which it thinks a sham), while the Liberal Democrats only remained ahead in May 2015 thanks to the failure of their vote reform attempt.
So UKIP ultimately flopped at supplanting the Liberal Democrats. Yet the collapse in Britain’s foremost pro-European force – so shortly after a catastrophic and highly publicised debate on Europe – must surely be worth considering in light of the fast approaching EU referendum. So, why did they lose?
According to the polls, Clegg lost both debates to Farage by a wide margin. The main focus of Clegg’s argument was on fear, with a secondary focus on hope and identity. Clegg began: “This debate is about you. And it’s really simple, because it’s about your job. Or if not your job, the job of someone else that you know”.
Clegg went on to mention his secondary focus on “who we are”, i.e. “a Britain that leads in the world” through the EU. But this hierarchy set the tone for the debate, with Clegg constantly touting his fidelity to “the facts” (mainly applied to economics), as if such facts do not necessarily require interpretation through a particular lens.
None of this is to say that the economic argument should be seen as unimportant, or that it should be in any way neglected by the In campaign; there is clearly no danger of that happening anyway. But some of the disappointing poll trends for the pro-European campaign may be explained by the reversed focus of Farage.
In contrast to Clegg, Farage began by stating how long this debate had taken to come about, instantly portraying himself as an underdog compared to the “political class”. He depicts the side of In as a “tired status quo” while his is a “fresh approach”, aimed at being “friendly with Europe” without being “governed by their institutions”.
Interestingly, the othering of Europe apparent from the above was casually and consistently taken for granted by both candidates, speaking of their continent as a distinct entity, and of its institutions not as theirs but as purely those of foreign forces. Failing to challenge such false premises obviously lends itself to the Out narrative.
As an island on the north-western edge of Europe, Britain is the world’s most European country. All its formative historical experiences could come from nowhere else but Europe. Britain is as European as Japan is East Asian. Both are the distilled, unadulterated essence of their respective continents.
Even once Britain’s influence spread beyond its own continent around the world, it did not become unique any more than all the other Western European empires which preceded or outlived the British Empire. That is, even in the developments which allegedly made Britain exceptional, it merely followed mainstream European trends.
Clegg never pointed out that Britain is a part of Europe (regardless of its EU status), he never questioned Farage’s central “cast iron guarantee” referendum myth (levelled against David Cameron while ignoring the clear caveats he specified at the time), and he never questioned the myth of the 1975 EEC referendum as a stab in the back.
At the same time as he missed all of this, Clegg pointlessly made a focal point out of Farage’s alleged use of “myths” and “fantasy”. Not fighting for such core principles allows the Out campaign to shape and distort the very context within which the debate is had. Clegg’s failings in this respect exemplify those of today’s wider In campaign
As a result of these failings, calls for a more impassioned In campaign are increasing. But if it is to be genuine, this passion must be rooted in core principles while providing an alternative understanding of them. Sovereignty is one such principle, consistently eschewed by the Liberal Democrats and the wider In campaign.
Understanding sovereignty – as pro-Europeans of the 1960s and 1970s did – as based upon what Britain can actually do as much as on what is has the right to declare, is a perfectly intelligible way of getting the message across that the In campaign first and foremost seeks to enhance British sovereignty. Why not fight for such principles?
Nick Robinson stated: “History will record that Nigel Farage was the winner of these debates. Nick Clegg will hope that, nevertheless, he may have won something too by being seen to challenge Britain's political insurgent.” Clegg was wrong. Instead, he set the tone for a lacklustre campaign which must be overcome.
The uninspiring and fear-based focus on economics is thriving in today’s EU debate. Since the In campaign has struggled to impassion anyone, it is resorting to economic scare tactics. It cannot convince people of the value of all that is already possible within Europe, and so it is worrying them with what might be impossible outside it.
Despite the In campaign’s unenthused, fear-based campaign, it seems Britain is likely to stay in the EU. But by surrendering principles so basic as the UK’s status as being geographically within Europe, can we expect this issue to remain buried for long? As in Scotland, all the historical momentum is conceded to the separatists.
It is probable that a majority only somewhat larger than Scotland 2014 will be achieved. But a dreary In campaign and perceived bias against Out could fuel a narrative that keeps hopes for another referendum alive, again, as in Scotland. It is, then, essential to win the ideological battle as well as the referendum itself.
Furthermore, a campaign only able to sustain a hollow victory leaves things up in the air in the event of an unexpected event. A terrorist attack, or any such major international development could totally and unexpectedly transform history. So there cannot be any room for complacency in the face of such small margins of error.
If the In campaign wants to see a Britain in control of global events and not at their mercy, it must learn from the mistakes of “the party of In” and fundamentally change its approach in arguing for Europe. For one, it should recognise the continent that we exist in. Only by getting such basic principles straight can it hope to convince others.
